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Abstract
Recently, the European Aviation Safety Agency and other civil aviation authorities introduced a regulatory framework for 
low- and medium-risk operations of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) where medium-risk operations fall into the ‘specific’ 
category. Other introduced categories are the ‘open’ category for very-low-risk operations and the ‘certified’ category for 
high-risk operations that are comparable to manned aviation. This framework has the potential to reduce the certification 
costs compared to manned civil aviation. This paper discusses the challenges for operators of high-altitude platforms who 
aim for medium-risk UAS operations in the ‘specific’ category. It also shows ways to obtain an operation approval in the 
‘specific’ category and how to deal with the associated operational requirements to perform such long-endurance UAS mis-
sions. Moreover, problems the high-altitude platform operator has to face when applying SORA are discussed. The paper 
closes with a promising approach to further enable high-altitude operations and to face some of the problems that occurred 
in the applicability of SORA to high-altitude platform operations by the use of 4D-operational volumes and unmanned traffic 
management (UTM) services.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
for different kinds of operation greatly increased. Primarily 
operations at low or medium altitudes enjoy great popular-
ity. However, there is an increasing number of applications 
that require stationary platforms at high altitudes of around 
20 km. These, High-Altitude Platforms (HAP) are meant to 
perform operations over a long time period with minimal 
interactions with regular manned air traffic. HAP opera-
tions often include continuous high-altitude observation 
of a certain area. Some examples of those earth observa-
tion operations are cargo ship emission measurements and 
glacier observations. Such HAPs are in competition with 
fast low-orbiting satellites. Due to their orbital paths, single 
satellites always have a delay in time if they are used to 
observe a specific area. To reduce that delay, several satel-
lites can be used, but this comes with the disadvantage of 
much higher costs.
To cope with UAS and to integrate such systems into the 
modern air traffic management system, aviation authorities 
around the world had to introduce a new regulatory frame-
work for unmanned systems. This framework has to take all 
different kinds of operation into account, both very-low-risk 
operations, such as small toy drones operated over fields, and 
operations of larger scale UAS operated over urban areas. 
Therefore, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
introduced three new general categories of UAS opera-
tions in 2016 [1]. These three categories are now part of the 
unmanned civil aviation regulation [2, 3]. The categories 
address the risk that the different types of UAS operations 
pose to people on ground and manned air traffic. Operations 
that pose a minor risk to people, such as the aforementioned 
toy drones operated over unpopulated areas in visual line of 
sight (VLOS), are regulated in the ‘open’ category. Very-
high-risk operations with a risk comparable to manned avia-
tion, such as large-scale UAS operating over inhabited areas 
or unmanned transportation of people, are covered in the 
‘certified’ category. All those operations whose risk lies in 
between the two examples fall into the ‘specific’ category.
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The EASA released a Notice of Proposed Amendment 
(NPA) as ‘Introduction of a regulatory framework for the 
operation of drones’ in 2017 [4] as a form of consultation 
within the EASA rulemaking process and further introduced 
measures to mitigate the risk of operations in the ‘open’ 
and the ‘specific’ categories. This NPA was followed by 
Opinion No 01/2018 [5] that was intended to implement 
an operation-centric, risk- and performance-based regula-
tory framework for the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ categories. The 
rulemaking process was finished by the EASA in 2019 with 
release of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2019/947 [2] and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2019/945 [3].
Insight in the ‘specific’ category’s regulatory framework 
and how to apply its safety assessment to UAS operations 
on the example of HAP operations is provided throughout 
this paper. Furthermore, we present approaches to integrate 
HAPs into existing Air Traffic Management (ATM) in a safe 
manner. We also discuss the operational challenges of such 
long-endurance, high-altitude operations the operator has 
to face.
2  Regulatory framework of the ‘specific’ 
category
Crucial part of the ‘specific’ category is the requirement 
to conduct a risk assessment of the intended UAS opera-
tion. A risk assessment methodology that is adopted by 
the EASA [5] is the Specific Operations Risk Assessment 
(SORA) developed by the Joint Authorities for Rulemak-
ing of Unmanned Systems (JARUS) [6]. In this section 
a brief overview of the SORA methodology is given. A 
more detailed description of SORA and a comparison to an 
already existing safety assessment approach are given in [7].
The SORA (Fig. 1) is an iterative process to assess the 
intrinsic risk of a UAS operation, to incorporate risk miti-
gation strategies and establish the requirements that the 
operator has to meet to obtain an operation approval of the 
competent authority. The input to this process is a concept 
of operations document (ConOps) that contains a descrip-
tion of the intended operation, technical data of the UAS and 
information on the operator.
With the ConOps information, initial Ground and Air 
Risk Classes are determined. These two classes take the pop-
ulation density and the air traffic density in the operational 
volume as well as adjacent to it into account. To lower the 
operational risk, mitigation strategies can be applied. The 
Ground Risk Class including applied mitigations can range 
from 0 to 7, while the Air Risk Class range from ARC-a 
for a-typical airspace to ARC-d for highly frequented air-
space such as an airport environment. Ground and Air Risk 
Class combined with applied mitigation strategies result in 
a Specific Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL). Tied to the 
SAIL are a number of Operational Safety Objectives (OSO), 
or in other words, requirements the operator has to meet. 
The OSO shall ensure a safe UAS operation; therefore, they 
address the technical and design capabilities of the UAS as 
well as the operator in form of operational, crew training and 
maintenance requirements. There are six levels with increas-
ing rigor from SAIL I to SAIL VI. The required OSO and the 
operator’s solution to meet them are also an integral part of 
the ConOps. The complete ConOps has to be submitted to 
the national competent authority. A detailed description of 
the SORA process can be found in [6].
3  Use case scenarios and SORA analysis
In this section, some typical use cases for HAPs are 
described and analyzed with the SORA process in its latest 
edition [6]. The use cases are chosen to show the spectrum 
of possible HAP operations from a regulatory and opera-
tional effort point of view.
In case of the SORA analysis the mission examples can 
be classified by their initial ground risk. The SORA distin-
guishes the HAP-relevant scenarios to determine the ini-
tial ground risk class in flights beyond visual line of sight 
(BVLOS) in sparsely populated environments and in popu-
lated environments. Until now, there is no explanation pro-
vided by JARUS when to consider a sparsely populated and 
when a populated environment. It is plausible to assume that 
each national civil aviation authority has its own definition 
of sparsely and populated environment. However, regarding 
the possible operational areas shown in Fig. 2 and consider-
ing the operational altitude of a HAP, some assumptions 
can be made. It is relatively safe to assume that glaciers and 
snow surfaces observation, Northeast Passage icing observa-
tion, maritime surveillance over the Mediterranean Sea and 
animal tracking in South Africa will be considered sparsely 
Fig. 1  Simplified SORA process modified from [8]
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populated. Flood and earthquake monitoring in Central or 
Southern Europe will be most likely considered populated. 
The ship emissions observation operation is planned to take 
place over the English Channel. While the sea itself might 
be considered sparsely populated, taking the HAP altitude of 
20 km and the seaports of the relatively small English Chan-
nel into account, the operational area might have a populated 
environment rating.
As small summary, the classification of the HAP use case 
operations regarding their initial ground risk class (GRC) 
according to the SORA is shown in Table 1. This class takes 
the HAP’s characteristic dimension of over 8 m into account.
Within the SORA, it is essential to know that only opera-
tions with a GRC of less than seven are covered by this 
assessment. Operations with a GRC of more than seven 
are considered to be too dangerous and should not be per-
formed in the ‘specific’ category. However, it is possible to 
reduce the initial GRC by means of mitigation. The SORA 
introduces three possible forms of mitigation that reduce 
the GRC when applied. The amount of reduction is defined 
by the integrity of a mitigation and its assurance. Integrity 
and assurance are combined in the term robustness. Within 
SORA there exist three levels of robustness: low, medium 
and high. A low level of assurance is typically achieved by 
declaration, a medium level of assurance is achieved by 
supporting evidence such as analyses and simulations and 
a high level of assurance requires competent third-party 
verification. Table 2 shows applicable mitigations and their 
effects on the GRC.
M1 is a mitigation where an area around the area of oper-
ation is used to reduce the number of people at risk when 
the UAS leaves the operational volume. Within SORA this 
certain area is called ground risk buffer. The operator has to 
verify that the number of people at risk inside the ground 
risk buffer is less than in the buffer’s surrounding area, e.g. 
by means of population density maps. Depending on how 
much credit for the buffer shall be taken to reduce the ground 
risk, the buffer has to follow at least a 1-to-1 rule, meaning 
the buffer size depends on the UAS altitude. If the lowest 
requirement for the ground risk buffer is applied to a HAP, a 
flight altitude of 20 km would result in a ground risk buffer 
of 20 km around the area of operation. On higher robustness 
classes, starting at medium robustness, the buffer has to take 
weather conditions, aircraft performance such as the glide 
ratio and the occurrences of single failures, which would 
lead to operation outside of the operational volume, into 
account.
M2 shall significantly reduce the impact energy up to a 
level where it can be reasonably assumed that a fatality will 
not occur. This can be achieved by the use of additional 
equipment or by strategy, such as an emergency parachute.
M3 is an emergency response plan that shall limit the 
escalating effects of a UAS crash and define conditions to 
alert the responsible ATM. It shall handle situations where 
the operation is out of control.
It is up to the operator to decide if one or more mitiga-
tions are used to reduce the initial ground risk. However, 
when applied the mitigations must comply with the require-
ments given by SORA, depending on the level of robust-
ness. As example in case of a HAP, the DLR aims for a low 
M1 robustness and a medium M2 and M3 robustness. The 
specific requirements to be able to claim low and medium 
robustness for M1 and M2 are shown in Annex B of the 
SORA Guidelines. Since this paper is focusing on the opera-
tional part of a HAP system, the mitigation of interest is M3. 
The requirements to claim medium robustness for M3 are 
that the ERP
Fig. 2  Mission examples for HAP operations
Table 1  Initial GRC classification of HAP use case operations
HAP use case operation Initial GRC 
Glaciers and snow surfaces observation 6
Maritime surveillance 6
Northeast passage icing observation 6
Animal tracking 6
Ship emissions over the english channel 10
Flood and earthquake monitoring 10
Table 2  Mitigations to reduce the GRC 
Mitigations to reduce the GRC Robustness
Low Medium High
M1—strategic mitigations for ground risk 0 None
− 1 Low
− 2 − 4
M2—effects of ground impact are 
reduced
0 − 1 − 2
M3—an Emergency Response Plan 
(ERP) is in place, operator validated 
and effective
1 0 − 1
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• Is suitable for the situation
• Limits the escalating effects
• Defines criteria to identify an emergency situation
• Clearly delineates remote crew member(s) duties
To assure the effectiveness of the ERP it
• Is developed to standards considered adequate by the 
competent authority and/or in accordance with means 
of compliance acceptable to that authority
• Is validated through a representative table top exercise 
consistent with the ERP training syllabus
• A record of the ERP training completed by the relevant 
staff is established and the record is kept up to date
Applying all those mitigations (M1–M3) will lower the 
initial GRC to 4 in case of operations over sparsely popu-
lated environments and to 8 in case of populated environ-
ments. A final GRC of 8 means that this operation cannot 
be performed in the ‘specific’ category. For operations with 
a final GRC of 8 either mitigations with a higher robustness 
have to be applied or the operator has to rely on a special 
permit. This might be the case after catastrophic events such 
as earthquakes where the country’s authority might wish to 
use a HAP to help save human lives.
After the ground risk branch is completed, the air risk 
class (ARC) has to be determined. In general, the initial air 
risk class depends the air traffic density to be expected in the 
operational volume, respectively the expected encounter rate 
with manned aircraft. The aircraft encounter rate is based on 
the ICAO airspace classification. The air risk class ranges 
from ARC-a for an atypical airspace with an encounter rate 
of 10−6 per flight hour up to ARC-d for controlled civil air-
space 500 ft above ground level. For the overall ARC deter-
mination, the operation’s highest ARC rating has to be con-
sidered. The ARC rating then has impact on the SAIL and 
additionally on “tactical mitigations” which are ARC-driven 
air risk-specific requirements for the aircraft and the opera-
tor. Annex D of the JARUS guidelines on SORA shows the 
specific performance requirements of the tactical mitigations 
for all air risk classes. The tactical mitigation performance 
assurance requirements (TMPR) vary from no requirements 
at all for ARC-a up to high requirements, which are based on 
aviation standards, for ARC-d. The integrity requirements 
of the general system that performs the tactical mitigations, 
called Tactical Mitigation System in SORA terms, range 
from less than one loss per 100 flight hours for ARC-a to less 
than one loss per 100,000 flight hours for ARC-d (Table 3).
Within the SORA process, the general ARC rating for 
very-high-altitude flights above flight level 600, around 
18 km, is ARC-b. However, a HAP will ascend and descend 
at least once right through all airspace categories from 
ground level to the HAP’s cruise altitude above the civil Ta
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airspace. Therefore, the highest air risk class, ARC-d, 
applies for any HAP operation as initial ARC.
Similar to the ground risk classification, the operator 
is allowed to use the so-called “strategic mitigations”. To 
reduce the initial ARC, the operator is allowed to show that 
the actual encounter rate within the operational volume is 
less than the general classification and/or the time of expo-
sure in a certain high-density airspace class is very low to 
justify a lower residual ARC.
Table 3 shows that it is always beneficial to try to reduce 
the initial ARC to ARC-b at least. The TMPR and qualita-
tive criteria shown in Annex D of the JARUS Guidelines on 
SORA for ARC-b are much easier to achieve and to prove, 
compared to the other ARC TMPR requirements.
In the HAP use case scenarios, there are two occasions 
where ARC-b does not initially apply. Ascent and descent 
will be through all airspace classes and additionally the 
HAP will descend to 15.5 km at night time and, therefore, 
operates within controlled civil airspace. Potential strategic 
mitigations and operational concepts as an argument for an 
ARC-b or even ARC-a rating are given in chapter 4.
For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that these 
strategic mitigations will result in an overall ARC-b. The 
reasoning for the ARC reduction is described in Sect. 4. The 
resulting SAIL is determined by the combination of GRC 
and ARC. However, it is the higher risk class that establishes 
the resulting SAIL. The interaction between GRC rating and 
residual ARC resulting in a SAIL classification can be seen 
in Table 4.
The final GRC of 4 for the BVLOS operations in sparsely 
populated environments together with the assumed ARC-b 
result in SAIL III.
As shown in Fig. 1, the SAIL expresses how each of 
the 24 operational safety objectives (OSO) required by the 
SORA has to be fulfilled. All OSO are described in Annex 
E of the JARUS guidelines on SORA.
The following chapter discusses an operational concept to 
integrate a HAP system in civil airspace and as mentioned 
above, the necessary reasoning for an air risk reduction to 
ARC-b level.
4  Operational concept to integrate 
a HAP system into civil airspace 
regarding the SORA requirements
Strategic mitigation measures reducing the ARC have to be 
categorized along the flight phases. A distinction is made 
between climb, cruise and descent.
To be able to reduce the risk level during the climb and 
descent phases, separation from the rest of the traffic is 
assumed for this part of the flight. This means that these 
flight phases are carried out within restricted airspaces. 
It should be noted that such measures reduce the specific 
risk, but that the establishment or activation of appropri-
ate flight restriction areas, depending on the traffic load 
at the planned flight location, results in an impairment of 
air traffic. In addition to the location of the restricted area, 
its spatial characteristics and the duration of the required 
activation are decisive for the magnitude of the impact. 
It must, therefore, be the aim to keep these effects as low 
as possible while at the same time fulfilling the safety 
requirements.
During mission flight as well as in special transfer 
flight phases, the HAP concept considered here assumes 
the use of an altitude range between 15.5 km and about 
25 km. A descent below 20 km during the night will be 
performed to save electrical energy by the use of its poten-
tial energy. This corresponds with entering ICAO class A 
or C airspaces.
For class A airspaces, only Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR) flights are permitted. All flights are provided with 
air traffic control service and are separated from each 
other. Class C airspace permits Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights, all flights 
are provided with air traffic control service and IFR flights 
are separated from other IFR flights and from VFR flights. 
VFR flights are separated from IFR flights and receive traf-
fic information in respect of other VFR flights [9].
When a HAP has to descend to ICAO class A or class C 
airspaces, it has to comply with either IFR or VFR. How-
ever, it is obvious that a UAS cannot fly under VFR and 
IFR addressing UAS have yet to be developed. Neverthe-
less, focusing only on existing minimum equipment lists 
for IFR even they become quite a challenge for HAP. Main 
reason is the aircraft’s limited mass budget because of the 
very high operational altitude among other limiting fac-
tors such as available solar energy and battery technology. 
Considering especially the general operational concept of 
an unmanned HAP, for practical reasons carrying certain 
equipment elements does not seem to make sense, e.g. the 
Table 4  SAIL determination SAIL determination
Final GRC Residual ARC 
a b c d
 ≤ 2 I II IV VI
3 II II IV VI
4 III III IV VI
5 IV IV IV VI
6 V V V VI
7 VI VI VI VI
 > 7 Out of scope of 
SORA
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integration of a Very-High-Frequency Omni-Directional 
Range (VOR) radio navigation system, Instrument Land-
ing System (ILS) and other navigation systems required on 
manned civil aircraft. Another prerequisite is the ability 
to communicate directly with air traffic control (ATC) via 
Very-High-Frequency (VHF) radio. Usually, redundant 
VHF devices are provided for this purpose. Deviating from 
this requirement, alternative solutions would seem to make 
sense in which only one VHF device is integrated and a 
telephone connection to the controller is set up as a second 
communication channel. Following this approach the situ-
ational awareness of the ATC could be held on an equal 
level without coming into conflict with the initial purpose 
of the redundant ATC communication. This approach also 
assumes that the remote pilot is in contact with the ATC 
at any time during the HAP mission. Even if HAP long-
endurance missions are heavily automated, we expect that 
a remote pilot has to be aware of the HAP current status 
and its environment. Considering necessary shift work it 
seems plausible to have ATC communication availability 
comparable to civil manned aviation. This might be pos-
sible if operating procedures have been agreed with the 
relevant national authorities in the near future in favor of 
our approach to make it possible to dispense with a further 
on-board radio system.
For the time the HAP flies in an altitude range above 
20 km or FL600 (depending on the definition of the upper 
airspace limit; in some states above 22 km or FL660), it 
operates within a zone without clearly defined regulations. 
This altitude zone above 20 km is addressed as “Higher 
Airspace”, or “Near Space”—depending on whether it is 
seen from the aviation or space domain. Although controlled 
airspace in most states is defined up to an altitude of 20 km 
(FL600) or 22 km (FL660), technically the sovereignty of 
states over their airspace does not end there. As there is no 
defined delimitation of air and space, higher airspace theo-
retically stretches up to very high altitudes and currently 
represents a region of ambiguous regulation.
This near space is seeing increased interest not only by 
HAP but also by the expansion of commercial space flight 
activities (including suborbital flights) and the emergence 
of new high-speed concepts for passenger transport. The 
variety of potential operating modes represents a particular 
challenge, as the higher airspace will get populated by very 
different users who might want to persistently stay or tran-
sit vertically and horizontally through it at vastly different 
speeds.
Despite this expected development, however, it can be 
assumed at the present time that only a low volume of air 
traffic prevails in altitudes above 15.5 km. The operational 
altitude of some business jets reaches up to this altitude 
limit, airliners fly up to a maximum altitude of just under 
14 km. Larger altitudes have so far been used primarily by 
military aircraft. Military aircraft in high altitudes could be 
a problem considering limited detectability. To avoid pos-
sible conflicts, care must be taken to ensure that at least the 
HAP can be detected with sufficient reliability, e.g. by the 
transponder carried and by ATC awareness. Even if ATC is 
not directly available in some cases, information that a HAP 
is going to operate in high altitudes useful to reduce conflict 
potential with military aircraft. To sum it up, the overall 
low volume of traffic in the operational altitude band should 
make a significant contribution to reducing the ARC.
An aspect not covered by the SORA ARC is the case of 
emergency descents into lower airspaces that may become 
necessary due to system failures. There are at least two 
points that need to be considered here. Even without a type 
certification, a fully operable HAP has to be developed with 
a strong focus on reliability. Long-endurance operations 
require hundreds and thousands of continuous operating 
hours without any maintenance. As an example, a long-
endurance operation of 100 days will add 2400 flight hours 
without maintenance to the HAP. To be able to survive such 
a mission with a decent likelihood, the HAP aircraft needs 
to have a failure rate of at least 10−4 per flight hour or even 
less. That is not quite civil manned aviation standard but it is 
not a bad reliability either. The second point that needs to be 
considered is the emergency descent procedure. This proce-
dure is strongly linked to manned aviation. The key factors 
are situational awareness of the pilots and ATC communi-
cation. In manned aviation, the pilot will have to detect the 
failure or the source of the problem at least and then inform 
the ATC about the emergency descent he has to perform. 
The handling in case of a HAP can be quite similar. We 
proclaimed before that the remote pilot and the remote crew 
as a whole need to have awareness of the aircrafts status and 
environment at any time during the mission. This aware-
ness shall also include detection of behavior that requires an 
emergency descent. The ATC will be informed of the emer-
gency together with additional information on, for example, 
altitude as well as heading and expected descent corridor.
5  Future work
To perform UAS operations within the ‘specific’ category, 
a risk assessment prior to the operation is necessary. EASA 
Opinion No 1/2018 [5] mentions the SORA as an acceptable 
means of compliance. However, [2] and [3] do not explicitly 
mention the SORA. It remains to be seen whether SORA 
will be used widely as risk assessment in the ‘specific’ 
category. One important aspect is the applicability to the 
UAS type and the type of operation. HAPs, for example, 
are a very special type of UAS with unique properties and 
operational scenarios. When applied to a HAP, it seems that 
SORA is written with common UAS types in mind, such 
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as small- and medium-size fixed-wing UAS or multi-rotor 
UAS. Even mitigations for air risk and ground risk do not 
seem to be designed for those ultra-lightweight high-altitude 
UAS. We showed that the application on a HAP rely on 
assumptions and guessing on more than one occasion and 
thus, is difficult to apply. That may be supported by the fact 
that until now, no HAP operation is performed in civil air-
space or with SORA applied. There might be many more 
cases where the applicability of the SORA might be ques-
tionable. However, we recommend is to use SORA as a basis 
in research projects such as DLR’s HAP and to comment 
and justify amendments to the general SORA requirements 
in dialogue with the competent aviation authorities. Never-
theless, compared to the whole certification process of the 
manufacturer and the aircraft itself, SORA is relatively easy 
to use and might be a good starting point for manufacturers, 
operators and authorities to get a feeling on how HAP need 
to be handled.
When focusing on the ‘specific’ category and SORA, the 
‘certified’ category, whose regulatory content has yet to be 
developed, has to be considered as well. It seems plausi-
ble, regarding the different certification specifications for 
manned aircraft which differ depending on aircraft size and 
purpose, that corresponding UAS certification specifica-
tions will also distinguish between different types of UAS. 
In fact, JARUS published a certification specification for 
UAS at the end of October 2019 [10]. This document is 
meant as guidance material to develop airworthiness design 
standards and can be used in combination with other accept-
able standards for specific UAS types. As an example, there 
might be a unique certification specification for each type, 
e.g. very large UAS for transport purposes, UAS for pas-
senger transport purposes and lightweight UAS that are still 
considered certified. Since SORA is designed to cover all 
potential operations between the ‘open’ category and the 
‘certified’ category, it is likely that the “high-end” SORA 
SAIL will interfere with “low end” UAS certification speci-
fications such as a certification specification for lightweight 
UAS. In this case, it is expected that most UAS operators 
and manufacturers will aim for the certification specification 
to get a type certification and be allowed to fly everywhere, 
in contrast to an approval in the ‘specific’ category which 
allows the operator to use the UAS for a defined operation 
in a defined location. In conclusion, it is still open if the 
‘specific’ category with SORA, or a similar risk assessment, 
will be the favored option in the future or a newly developed 
certification specification, especially for lightweight UAS 
such as HAP.
Anyway, with respect to the increased interest in using 
higher airspace, it has already been recognized on an inter-
national level by states, industry and institutions—including 
ICAO—that this development will require actions regarding 
a common and interoperable concept of operation. There 
is a need “to ensure the interoperability of operations and 
standardization of processes … for the purpose of higher air-
space operations and at the interface with controlled airspace 
below FL600” [11]. A possible approach to such a concept 
of operation for the higher airspace and near space regions 
has been presented in [12]. Considering the larger speed 
differences between operating vehicles in higher airspace, 
the outlined concept recognizes the requirements for traf-
fic control which vary considerably from regular airspace. 
Tactical control, meaning short term commands for traffic 
control and conflict avoidance by the ATM, becomes inef-
fective and maintaining safe separation via preplanned flight 
trajectories becomes mandatory. This requires planning 
operations ahead in time to remain conflict free during their 
execution. Therefore, the so-called 4D operating zones get 
attached to each vehicle, which then might be managed by a 
system under supervision of an appropriate entity or driven 
by the operators themselves. Developments in the currently 
discussed concepts for management of unmanned systems 
can also be taken into account here, like UTM (Unmanned 
Traffic Management) or U-Space [13, 14], which intend to 
support a safe, efficient and secure access to airspace for 
large numbers of drones by providing a set of new services 
and specific procedures. The monitoring of compliance with 
the planned flight trajectories in the described environment 
poses a significant challenge, as the expected diverse operat-
ing modes might not be commonly equipped and the current 
surveillance infrastructure has not been designed to cover 
the respected area of operation sufficiently. This will require 
an approach using a multi-source surveillance system which 
also includes operators to provide their vehicle state vectors 
as well as intended flight plans.
The approach described above is not an explicit solu-
tion to the applicability of SORA to HAP operations, nor 
for certification requirements of HAP. However, we think 
we described a way to help to enable future high-altitude 
operations and help to further improve ‘specific’ and ‘certi-
fied’ category operations. 4D-operational zones along with 
UTM/U-Space services could be a promising answer to the 
problems we faced when we assessed the SORA air risk 
including possible strategic and necessary tactical mitiga-
tions. The approach will be further researched as the DLRs 
own high-altitude platform project evolves.
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